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Abstract 
The study of how humans establish mutual understanding 
is intertwined with the design of artificial conversation 
systems [1,2,3,4,5]. The focus of this paper is perspective-
taking in and artificial imitation of communication. Regardless 
of whether an engineer takes psychological theory into 
consideration when building an agent, an underlying 
philosophy of perspective-taking is evident when observing 
the agent’s performance. Furthermore, theories of perspective-
taking offer designers an advantage in two ways: 1) These 
agents could better imitate human behavior. 2) These agents 
could use common tendencies in human behavior as an 
advantage in communicating with humans. 
Index Terms: discourse, dialogue, human speech 
understanding, joint costs, speech dialogue systems, 
perspective-taking in communication, cognitive load in 
communication 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, I focus on two main topics, both of which 
concern how human interlocutors take each other’s 
perspectives into consideration when communicating. The first 
of these is an argument that all communicative systems must 
be built upon the foundation of a communicative theory (or a 
combination of communicative theories), regardless of 
whether it is the designer’s intention. Furthermore, this 
fundamental principle of implementation is so entwined with 
the design of the agent that by observing a particular agent, 
the theory (or theories) at the core of its composition should 
be evident by observing its conversational behavior.  
The second topic of this paper is not an argument. Rather, 
it is a suggestion of how software designers could use the 
psychological theories on perspective-taking to their 
advantage. The results from human experimental studies show 
how humans behave. Usually, in artificial intelligence in 
general and in computational communication in particular, 
such findings are used to aid in imitation. I.e., in creating 
machines that act similar to humans (as indicated by the 
frequent goals of passing the Turing Test or achieving the 
distinction of having been awarded the Loebner Prize). In this 
paper, I suggest that a successful communicative agent needs 
to be more than ‘intelligent’. It must also be clever. It should 
be clever enough to not only imitate the human interlocutor, 
but also to use what we know about how humans 
communicate to its advantage. As the human mind is not as 
computationally capable as the computer in many (if not all) 
respects, it is required for the brain to use many heuristics and 
short-cuts in order to process language and successfully 
communicate. There are many consequences of this tendency 
that relate directly to creating chatbots. Unfortunately, many 
of these consequences provide designers with challenges in 
creating agents compatible with human interlocutors, 
including problems with framing, associations, and 
(debatably) connotations or meaning.  
However, I will argue in this paper that there is also an 
upside to the human tendency to take short-cuts in 
communicative processes. Namely, humans tend to make a 
number of assumptions when entering into a communication. 
Instead of trying to model a chatbot that imitates these 
assumptions, I suggest that it would be better to model a 
chatbot that takes advantage of this tendency. My stance is 
that incorporating more psycholinguistic theory into agent 
creation will be advantageous for engineers of communicative 
systems who aim to make agents more believable or more 
compatible with human interlocutors. This second topic will 
be discussed further in section 3 of this paper. In the following 
section, I present my argument that chatbots are inevitably 
founded upon communication theory. 
2. The Theory behind the Implementation 
2.1. The Collaborative Communication Model 
Currently, most prominent communicative agents (as assessed 
by the winning of a Loebner Prize) tend to take Wilkes-Gibbs 
and Clark’s collaborative communication model [6] for 
granted as the fundamental perspective-taking theory. Again, 
this occurs regardless of whether it was the engineer’s 
intention to take a particular theory into mind during 
development. According to the collaborative communication 
model, speakers and listeners are both continuously and 
actively involved in establishing mutual understanding 
(grounding). At each step in the conversation, both 
interlocutors are continually monitoring one another to assure 
that they are both on the same page, so to speak.  
In this paper, I demonstrate that although this model is a 
good starting-point for the implementation of communicative 
bots, there are also other theories on perspective-taking in 
communication that could be useful for software engineers to 
exploit. To illustrate the underlying inevitability of 
psychological theory in the development of artificial 
communication, I present examples of prominent computer 
programs that were put into communication with one another 
or a human. In viewing actual communications of these 
chatbots, the frequency of the collaborative communication 
model as the underlying  theory becomes evident.  
In a special issue of Discover Magazine, two highly 
regarded chatbots were set up to converse with each other [7]. 
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One of these is Richard Wallace's A.L.I.C.E., which is 
programmed similarly to its predecessor ELIZA [8]. More 
specifically, responses are triggered by inputs from the human 
interlocutor: "Input sentences are analyzed on the basis of 
decomposition rules which are triggered by key words 
appearing in the input text. Responses are generated by 
reassembly rules associated with selected decomposition 
rules" [9]. The other chatbot from the Discover article is Rollo 
Carpenter's Jabberwacky, which is programmed to keep track 
of what has been said to it, and reuse those statements [10]. 
Below is an excerpt of their conversation [7]. 
A.L.I.C.E.: Are you alive? 
Jabberwacky: Perhaps. 
A: Why the uncertain tone? 
J: Everything is uncertain except for five facts. 
A: The whole universe? 
J: And we both might just be some ones and zeros in the 
computer memory. 
A: Do you dream? 
J: Yes, I dream. 
A: It goes without saying. Do you remember your 
dreams? 
J: I remember them vividly. 
A: What do you remember about it? 
J: I think I shouldn’t flirt with a robot.  
There is an evident frequent lack of cohesion between the two 
chatbots' statements. Although A.L.I.C.E. is a modern, 
modified version of the 1966 ELIZA, many of the original 
communicative challenges that existed with ELIZA remain. 
Certainly the addition of Jabberwacky's artificiality could 
amplify the degree of incoherence of the ‘conversation’ 
beyond what would exist had one of the participants been 
human. Nonetheless, the excerpt demonstrates the state of 
artificial conversation. A.L.I.C.E. and Jabberwacky are among 
the most impressive chatbots in existence today, both having 
received recent annual runner’s-up Loebner prizes [11].  
     According to the collaborative communication model, 
speakers and listeners share the goal of achieving a mutual 
understanding [6]. Both must, at all points in the 
communication from initiation to completion, assess each 
other’s understanding, hold models of themselves and each 
other, and repeatedly update these models. It is certainly true 
that A.L.I.C.E. and Jabberwacky do not have models of each 
other encoded when communicating with each other. This is 
not the argument that I am making. However, I do mean to say 
that this collaborative view of human communicative behavior 
underlies the design of both of these programs.  
Both chatbots are designed to communicate based on what 
has been discussed with the particular partner in the current 
communication. These two programs both work based on an 
assumption that the basic components of a communication are 
on a phrase-by-phrase basis and that the most immediate input 
will be the most relevant stimulus for the upcoming output. 
Although I am using a very elementary description of the 
chatbots’ computation and the principles behind the 
collaborative communication model, it should be clear that the 
two have very similar interpretations of communication as 
their foundation. Perhaps this argument will become more 
clear when viewing how other theories of communication are 
not exemplified by these chatbots’ behaviors. 
2.2. The Monitoring and Adjustment Hypothesis 
Horton and Keysar’s monitoring and adjustment hypothesis 
[12] is based on two psychological theories. First is an 
availability heuristic, which states that one’s belief in 
something’s probability is related to how available it is to 
him/herself [13]. Second is an anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic, which states that people anchor to concepts and 
adjust as a repair [14]. These two hypotheses are merged and 
applied to language use, providing the following: Speakers 
tend to assume others’ perspectives to be more similar to their 
own than is usually true (availability), and they anchor their 
models of their listeners in their own perspectives and repair 
this model when necessary (anchoring and adjustment). 
Excellent examples of the tendency for people to 
overestimate the similarity between their own and others’ 
perspectives are provided by studies on irony judgments. 
People tend to judge speakers’ intentions based on private 
knowledge. This finding is in contrast with the collaborative 
communication model because the assumptions about the 
partner and the attributions and interpretations associated with 
the listener’s understanding were not mutually negotiated. 
Rather, they were based on egocentric tendencies. For 
example, Gibbs, O’Brien and Doolittle [15] found that people 
tended to attribute ironic meanings to speakers’ utterances 
even when the speakers themselves clearly did not know that 
their statements were untrue (e.g., saying of a cheater “Y 
would never cheat” was often taken as intended irony, even 
when the speakers were known to be unaware that Y was 
indeed a cheater). In a similar study, Keysar [16] had 
participants read notes from one friend to another. One friend 
had a miserable time at a restaurant that the other had 
suggested, and left him a note saying, “The restaurant was 
marvelous, just marvelous.” Overwhelmingly, participants 
assumed that the recipient of the note would understand that 
the speaker was being sarcastic. This is presumably because 
the participants erroneously assumed that others shared their 
own perspectives. 
Below, I demonstrate how the above chatbots’ 
conversation does not follow the monitoring and adjustment 
hypothesis. First, however, it will be useful to introduce 
another model of communication: Grice’s cooperative 
principle. More specifically, I will focus on Grice’s Maxim of 
Relation. This maxim is highly related to the monitoring and 
adjustment hypothesis in that it requires speakers to be 
relevant. If speakers are assumed to follow this maxim, they 
and their listeners should be able to successfully communicate 
from an egocentrically-based perspective without necessarily 
considering their partner’s perspective. 
Borrowing from Grice, consider the following situation: 
Two strangers encounter each other on the road. Person 1 says 
to Person 2, “I am out of petrol.” Person 2 responds, “There’s 
a garage round the corner” [17]. It is apparent that the second 
person is saying that the first person should try walking down 
to the gas station because it is probably still open. Person 1 
can then get the gas he needs and his problem will be solved. 
Out of context, the statement “There’s a gas station around the 
corner” would not imply all of these things. However, given 
that we expect Person 2 to say something relevant, it is 
assumed that he means all of these other things about the gas 
station. This is an example of the Maxim of Relation being 
followed and expected [18]. 
Like Grice’s other maxims, the Maxim of Relation can be 
flouted (i.e., violated to express alternate meanings). Grice 
gives the example of a group of women at a tea party. One of 
the women calls the host “an old bag” to which another guest 
responds, “The weather has been quite delightful this summer, 
hasn’t it?” In this situation, the flouting of the Maxim of 
Relation presumably implies that the second guest feels that 
calling the host “an old bag” is inappropriate [17].  
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In the tea party example, the abrupt change in topic is an 
intended flouting of the Maxim of Relation. In contrast, 
Jabberwacky’s and A.L.I.C.E.’s conversation offers a counter-
example to the floutings. In this dialogue, consistent 
nonsequitors are not floutings, but merely imperfect 
instantiations of language use: 
A: What do you remember about [your dream]? 
J: I think I shouldn’t flirt with a robot. [7] 
Perhaps the two robots are having an actual conversation and 
completely understand each other’s implicatures, even though 
it appears to the human that they are not quite making perfect 
sense. Although it is possible that computers are sentient and 
find dream recollection highly erotic, it is far more likely that 
this part of their interchange is a conversational imperfection.  
In contrast, another modification of ELIZA has frequent 
nonsequitors that rarely stir up suspicion. Jenny18 [19] is a 
rudimentary chatbot restricted to sex internet relay chat (IRC) 
rooms. In the following example from ‘her’ chat with the 
unsuspecting human interlocutor Luke_Thighrocker, jenny18 
has 18 turns. Below, jenny18’s 5th, 9th, and 13th turns and all of 
Luke_Thighrocker’s turns are omitted for the sake of avoiding 
vulgarity and honoring brevity. Notice that jenny18 is not 
contributing very much to the conversation, even when she is 
poked in the eye. 
1. hmm… 
2. what? 
3. uhh….. what? 
4. mmm yes, good!  
5. [omitted] 
6. I dunno what u mean =) 
7. come again? 
8. =) 
9. [omitted] 
10. come again? 
11. mmmmm, all right. let’s do it. 
12. ok… 
13. [omitted] 
14. ehh? 
15. mmmMm.. 
[Luke_Thighrocker pokes jenny18 in the eye.] 
16. oh ok 
17. was it good 4 u? lol 
18. mmmMm.. 
The Maxim of Relation and its consequent implicata are 
responsible for jenny18’s successes in this limited Turing-like 
test. In such a confined environment, her vague comments are 
often interpreted as sufficiently applicable to the conversation. 
One of the most common entries in this corpus is a crass 
version of the request to participate in sexual acts. Each of 
jenny18’s turns listed above (except maybe turn 17) would be 
a believable response to that question. Even when Thighrocker 
pokes her in the eye, her response is conversationally 
passable: “oh ok…was it good 4 u? lol.”  
Similarly, and more alarmingly, a Russian chatbot 
CyberLover has been infiltrating dating chat sites, and luring 
lovesick interlocutors into providing personal information or 
visiting malicious websites. Based on a recent news brief from 
PC Tools News, CyberLover’s creators claim that the chatbot 
is capable of establishing a new relationship with up to ten 
partners in just 30 minutes [20]. The chatbot’s victims are so 
convinced of its authenticity that they often fall for the 
designer’s deception, providing enough personal information 
to expose themselves to fraud.  
Ironically, Jabberwacky and A.L.I.C.E.’s challenge 
becomes an advantage for Jenny18 and CyberLover. But, asks 
A.I. Foundation News, “Does this bot really ‘pass the Turing 
Test’? Probably, for some of the people, some of the time, it 
does. Unlike scenarios such as the Loebner Prize Contest, it is 
easier to fool chat clients when they are not expecting to ‘out 
the bot,’” [21]. 
     The constraint on Jenny18 and CyberLover’s environments 
transforms the Maxim of Relation from an identity-exposing 
factor into an identity-concealing factor, disguising their 
artificiality from their interlocutors. Thus, the Maxim of 
Relation acts in Jenny18 and CyberLover’s favor. This relates 
very strongly to the monitoring and adjustment hypothesis. 
Jenny18 and CyberLover take advantage of the human 
tendency to hear conversations from an egocentrically-
oriented perspective. Unfortunately, however, this one 
characteristic of the bots that makes them so successful 
presupposes their passing the Turing Test. They are successful 
because they are not scrutinized as carefully as bots in the 
Loebner Prize Contest. 
In this paper, I argue that calculated and purposeful 
utilization of Horton and Keysar’s monitoring and adjustment 
hypothesis and Gricean theory in general (and his Maxim of 
Relation in particular) could substantially increase the efficacy 
of chatbots. Because humans tend to operate from somewhat 
egocentrically-based perspectives and expect communicative 
partners to be relevant, bots could conceivably add value, 
communicative depth, and even believability to their behavior 
by interspersing vague questions throughout their dialogues 
[22,23]. 
3. Constructing a Clever Intelligent Agent 
According to the previously mentioned collaborative 
communication model, speakers need positive evidence from 
their listeners before they can assume to share common 
ground with their listeners [24]. This means that at each stage 
in the communication, speakers require verification from their 
listeners that the listener has understood what has been said 
before introducing a new concept into the discussion. This is 
in opposition to the view that speakers will assume common 
ground with their listeners unless they receive negative 
evidence from their listeners (i.e., unless the listener gives 
feedback that indicates that they do not understand). Clark and 
Brennan outline three different forms of positive evidence: 
Acknowledgements, relevant next turns, and continued 
attention. Acknowledgments include continuers such as mm-
hmmm, gosh, and even some head nods from the ‘listener.’ 
Interlocutors can also indicate their understanding by 
responding to statements appropriately in relevant next turns 
[25,26].  
Because chatbots do not tend to process negative feedback 
in a particularly special way, I argue that they tend to follow 
the principles of communication whereby speakers rely on 
positive evidence. In an admittedly simplistic interpretation, 
the bots are relying on positive evidence far more than they do 
on negative evidence. However, the simplicity of this 
interpretation is due to the somewhat basic stage of artificial 
intelligence at this point in history. If computers were sentient, 
and were able to fully interpret whether their interlocutor’s 
statement related to their own previous turn, they would be 
more capable of recognizing what Clark and Brennan call 
‘relevant next turns’ [24]. 
A ‘clever’ intelligent agent could make use of the human 
tendency to assume that the Maxim of Relevance is being 
followed, to operate from an egocentrically-based perspective, 
and to assume grounding exists with one’s interlocutor unless 
given strong evidences to the contrary. It is quite possible that 
the Turing test as stated is far too difficult for a conversational 
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program simply because it triggers suspicion in the human 
interlocutor from the initiation of the conversation. Because 
the judge enters into the communication with the intention of 
discovering a robot on the other end of the communication, 
the artificial agent is not capable of using the very same tools 
that human interlocutors use in successfully communicating 
with their fellow humans. 
It is arguably the most important goal for a chatbot to be 
compatible with a human communicative partner. 
Believability and realism may be of secondary importance. 
Nonetheless, (regardless of an agent’s believability as an 
ultimate goal) I argue that more thoroughly evaluating and 
including Gricean theory and the monitoring and adjustment 
hypothesis into agent creation will be advantageous for 
engineers of communicative systems. 
4. Discussion & Conclusions 
Taking the monitoring and adjustment hypothesis into 
consideration when constructing a conversational agent should 
be quite advantageous for an engineer. It could make agents 
better at attaining both believability (if that is the ultimate goal 
of the system) and elicitation of interlocutor responses (if that 
is the goal of the system). There are a number of ways that the 
theory could be considered in implementing chatbots in the 
future: 1) Negative evidence from one’s interlocutor could be 
weighted differently in network encoding schemes. For 
example, certain phrases such as “I don’t understand” could be 
treated substantially differently than other inputs to the 
system, causing a sort of ‘red flag’ for the communicative 
system. 2) Programmers could take better advantage of the 
Maxim of Relation. A human interlocutor will assume that 
common ground exists unless given substantial negative 
evidence that disconfirms mutual understanding. Although this 
point may not help a program to win the Loebner Prize, it 
should have a positive impact on the chatbot’s communicative 
ability. 3) New measures for chatbot intelligence could be 
used in future studies.  
     Although the Turing test [28] is an admirable ambition, it 
was also proposed before the discovery of many human 
communicative behaviors were known. As we have learned 
more about the effects that the testing situation may have on 
the human judge, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
chatbots have not decisively passed the test due to human 
flaws and heuristics. Namely, the suspicious human judge 
behaves differently than the unsuspecting human interlocutor. 
It might be useful to also use a measure of chatbot intelligence 
in a new way. If a human is instructed to have a computer-
mediated conversation without being informed that the 
interlocutor is a computer, this conversation could later be 
given to another human. This uninformed overhearer 
(meaning an overhearer who does not know that one 
participant is human and the other is a chatbot) could then 
judge which interlocutor was the better communicator. With 
such a measure, it is not unreasonable to predict that some 
overhearers may conclude that the chatbot was more 
communicatively successful than the human. 
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